Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1952

State of Utah v. Don Jesse Neal : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Edw. M. Morrissey; Arthur A. Allen, Jr.; Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, State v. Neal, No. 7813 (Utah Supreme Court, 1952).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1717

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

7813

IN THE SUPREME CO·URT
OF THE STATE Q~F UTAH

-~··
"'_lT1
·h•~"

FII
'-

---

STATE OF UTAH,

I

-'

'

I

··- ........
... _. ___ .......... - _....
· ~h~~k. Suptt!m~ Cour~. Lt.atl
-----·~ -··-·~-~~-

-~

'.

··~

Plaintiff and Respondent,

Case
-vs.-

;

No. 7813

DON JESSE NEAL,
Defendant and Appella;nt.

Appellant's Brief
EDW. M. MORRISSEY
ARTHUR A. ALLEN, JR.
Attorneys for Defendant
and Appellant.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF FACTS...................................................................... 1-11
STATEMENT OF ERRORS .................................................................... ll-13
ARGUMENT:
POINT I. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER,
THERE BEING A LACK OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
THE INSTRUCTION GIVEN BY THE COURT. (Specification of Error No. I, (a) (b) (c).................................................. 13
POINT II. THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE WITNESS NORMAN R. CORTSEN, AND THE WITNESS MRS.
RONNIE CHARLOT TO TESTIFY OVER DEFENDANT'S
OBJECTIONS RELATIVE TO STATEMENTS MADE BY
THE DEFENDANT AFTER THE HOMICIDE. (Specification of Error No. 11.) ...................................................................... 16
POINT III. THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE WITNESS HAROLD W. CLARK, OVER DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS, TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE JURY THE
MOVABILITY OF HIS HANDS AND BODY WITH A GUN
IN HIS HANDS HANDCUFFED BEHIND HIM. (Specification of Error No. 111.) .................................................................. 22
POINT IV. THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY, OVER THE OBJECTIONS OF THE
DEFENDANT TO INTERROGATE THE DEFENDANT
RESPECTING THE COMMISSION OF CRIMES WITH
WHICH THE DEFENDANT HAD NEITHER BEEN
CHARGED NOR CONVICTED. {Specification of Errors
IV, V.) ····--··--·-·········-······-··------········----······----·-················-···---···-------····-- 30
POINT V. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL, SUCH MOTION
HAVING BEEN DENIED AND SENTENCE IMPOSED IN
THE ABSENCE OF COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANT.
(Specification of Error Nos. VI, VII, VIII.) ................................ 36
POINT VI. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A REHEARING OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL AND IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR AN ORDER FOR AN EXAMINATION OF DESIGNATED PHYSICAL EVIDENCE.
(Specification of Error Nos. IX, X.) .............................................. 37
POINT VII. THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED THE RIGHT
TO A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL. (Specification of
Error No. XI.) ...................................................................................... 39

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX OF CASES CITED

Page

Clancy v. State of Texas, 247 S.W. 865 ... ----------------------------------------------- 28
Cooper v. State, Okla., 67 P. (2d) 98L .. ------------------------------------------------ 24
Hall v. Brown, Ore., 202 P. 719 ...... ---------------------------------------------------------- 24
Hamby v. People, Colo., 129 P. (2d) 993------------------------------------------------ 24
Harper v. Blasi, Colo., 151 P. (2d) 760·--------------------------------------------------- 26
Jackson v. Utah Rapid Transit Co., 77 U. 21, 290 P. 970 .................... 19
Leonard v. Southern, 21 Ore. 555, 28 P. 887..... ------------------------------------- 25
Martin v. Anges City Baseball Ass'n., Cal., 40 P. (2d) 287 .............. 27
People v. Coughlin, 13 U. 58, 44 P. 94 ...................................................... 35
People v. Crawford, Cal., 106 P. (2d) 219 .............................................. 24
People v. Halbert, Cal., 248 P. 969 ........ ·-···································-------------- 26
People v. Sherman, 217 P. (2d) 715----------·----------------------···-------···········-- 28
People v. Wong Loung, 114 P. 829... ·--------------------------------------------------···· 20
State v. Aikers, 87 U. 507, 51 P. (2d) 1052·---·····---·----------·-··--···-···-------- 37
State v. Anderton, 81 U. 320, 17 P. (2d) 917..... ·------------------------------------ 35
State v. Copenbarge, Ida., 16 P. (2d) 383 ..... ·------------------------------·---·--- 24
State v. McKenna, Cal., 79 P. (2d) 1065...... ----------------------------------·····-·· 24
State v. Nemier, et al., 106 U. 307, 148 P. (2d) 327 ________________________ 34-35
State v. Owen, Kansas, 176 P. (2d) 564·------------------------------------------------- 34
State v. Peterson, 240 P. (2d) 504------------------------------------------------------------ 20
State v. Rasmussen, 92 U. 357, 68 P. (2d) 176·------------------------------------- 21

INDEX OF TEXTS CITED
Constitution of Utah, Article I, Sec. 12-------------------------------------------------- 37
22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, Sec. 682 __________________________________________________________ 33-34
Laws of Utah, 1943, Sec. 105-1-8 ______________________________________________________________ 37

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case

-vs.-

No. 7813
DOX JESSE REAL,

Defendant and Appellant.

Appellant's Brie·£
STATEMENT OF FACTS
An information charging Don Jesse Neal with the
crime of murder in the first degree was filed on June
23, 1951 (R. 10). A motion to dismiss the information
charging defendant with first degree murder was filed
on October 15, 1951, alleging as grounds for dismissal
of the information that the State failed to prove on the
preliminary hearing that the crime charged in such information was a willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing. The motion was, by the court, overruled (R. 17) and a plea of not guilty entered by the
defendant and the case came on for trial on October 2,
1951.
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The Jury was duly impanelled and sworn to try the
case (R. 33) and the State proceeded to offer testimony
in support of the charges of first degree murder as
alleged in the information. Such testimony disclosed
that on the 23rd day of May, 1951, at about two o'clock
P.M. the defendant, Wilma Lenoma Tully and Officer
Owen T. Farley were proceeding north on the east side
of State Street immediately north of the intersection of
Third South Street in Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County,
Utah, in a DeSoto sedan automobile driven by Owen T.
Farley, the defendant and \Vilma Lenoma Tully having been taken into custody by Officer Farley a few moments before at or near the east entrance on State Street
to Auerbach's Department Store. As the automobile
proceeded north on State Street and across the intersection at Third South and immediately in front of No.
261 South State Street at which place the automobile
collided with a parked automobile and immediately prior
to such collision a shot was heard. Officer Farley was
found lying on the street. Wilma Lenoma Tully left the
scene by the right hand door of the automobile and was
later apprehended at Wendover, Utah. The defendant
left the automobile from the opposite side and was later
apprehended several blocks from the scene. Officer Farley was removed to the hospital and died several hours
later.
Dr. Milton Pepper testified that he attended and
examined CJfficer Farley upon his arrival at Holy Cross
Hospital on May 23, 1951; that he found a penetrating
wound of the abdomen to the right of the navel and an
2
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exit wound in the back to the left of the middle just above
the hip and from such wound Officer Farley died about
3:45 P.ili., ~lay 23, 1951 (R. 36-37). Dr. John Marshall,
Assistant City Physician, testifed that he performed an
autopsy on the body of Officer Farley May 25, 1951, and
in his opinion the officer died from excessive loss of
blood; that he found a perforating wound in the abdomen measuring 1%" in diameter, the point of entry
being 2" above the navel and 1" to the right of the
middle line, the point of exit 2" to the left of the middle
line at the level of the second lumbar vertebra; that in
his opinion the missile that entered Officer Farley's
body went straight through and came out the back and
that the gun that fired the shot was pointed directly at
Officer Farley (R. 41-43).
Officer Hunsaker testified that on May 21, 1951, the
Salt Lake City Police Department received a telegram
from the Chief Probation Officer of the State of California requesting that the defendant be picked up and
described the automobile he was driving (R. 46). Officers Longson and Olson testified that the car described
in the telegram was located early on the morning of
1Iay 23, 1951 on the west side of State Street just south
of the intersection of Third South; that the automobile
was watched until approximately 2 P.M. on May 23,
1951, at which time the officers were relieved by Officer
Farley after having had a conversation with him near
the Center Theater on Third South and State Street, at
which time the car was pointed out to him. Officer Farley proceeded in the direction of the automobile shortly
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thereafter and Officer Olson observed that the car had
been moved. He got into his automobile and proceeded
south on State Street where the automobile had been
parked and observed that it had been moved. He then
made a turn on State Street and started north immediately behind the DeSoto automobile driven by Officer
Farley. Shortly after the car crossed the intersection of
Third South and State Street it struck the parked car
and immediately stopped. Officer Olson got out of his
car. He heard no shots or observed any disturbance in
the automobile driven by Officer Farley. He next saw
Officer Farley lying on the street between two cars and
heard him say, "Call the police," which were the only
words uttered by Officer Farley who immediately became unconscious. (R. 63). He remained with him until
the ambulance arrived.
Three witnesses produced by the State (R. 67-87)
all testified in substance that they were in the close
proximity of the DeSoto automobile parked on the west
side of State Street at or near the entrance to Auerbach's
Department Store. All observed a man and woman approach the automobile from the south and Officer Farley
approach from the north; that the woman entered the
car and sat down, and Officer Farley with his gun drawn
approached the man and after a conversation proceeded
to search his person. The search occupied from ten to
fifteen minutes and they observed Officer Farley completely search the defendant from his shoes to his head,
inside and outside, removing from the inside of his coat
pocket certain papers. At the completion of the search
4
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Officer Farley placed the man's hands behind him and
put his handcuffs on him with his hands to his back and
then assisted him into the automobile. Th~e woman remained in the automobile throughout the entire search
and had in her hands magazines, a package and a handbag and at no time did Officer Farley search the woman
or engage in conversation with her. Officer Farley
placed the defendant in the front seat between himself
and the woman, started the automobile, made a "U"
turn after backing out and proceeded north on State
Street in the direction of the Police Station (R. 67-87).
Glen A. Pratt testified that shortly after 2 P.M. on
~lay 23, 1951, he ·was crossing the intersection of Third
South and State Street in the direction of the Center
Theater and observed a DeSoto automobile proceeding
north through the intersection, saw the automobile crash
into a parked car after it had passed him and observed
that the occupants in the automobile were struggling.
He observed a woman leave the car, step over the curb
and disappear into the crowd. He saw Officer Farley
lying on the street with his head in the lap of a person
wearing a Postman's uniform. He observed Officer Farley and did not hear him talk or speak to anyone. (R. 91)
He saw a man running across the street to the west with
his hands behind him and his coat over them.
Witness Joseph M. Anderson stated that he was a
mail carrier; that he was in front of 261 South State
Street and had just come out of the Rogerson's Music
Company as the DeSoto automobile struck a parked car.
5
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He observed that there were three occupants in the front
seat of the car. The woman left the car first by the right
hand door, then one of the occupants fell from the car
to the street and just before the fall he heard words to
the effect, ''Do you want another one~'' or to the effect,
"If you want another one I'll give you one more." (R.
98-99). The witness lifted the head of Officer Farley
into his arms and while holding him Officer Farley
stated, "I am a police officer." "He shot me." "Call
the Department.'' No one else was assisting Officer
Farley and the witness did not see Officer Olson. He
was standing on' the sidewalk and did not get out .into
the street until the woman had left and Officer Farley
was out of the car (R. 108). He heard the statements
made while standing- on the sidewalk 18 or 20 feet away
and 3 feet from the door of Rogerson's Music Company.
There was a string of automobiles parked along the
street between the witness and the DeSoto car and at
the preliminary hearing he testified that he was 24 feet
away from the car when he heard the utterances testified
to (R. 110). Robert H. Jensen, Sr., Postman, testified
that he was in Rogerson's Music Store and heard two
cars hit together, and immediately stepped outside and
observed a scuffle in the automobile. He saw the right
door of the car open and a man come out head first rolling
partly under a parked car. There were three occupants
in the car. The woman left the car first and proceeded
north on State Street. He was about 10 feet from the
car and heard the man in the car say, "Do you want another~'' The man in the car got out on the west side and
6
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ran west across State Street with his arms behind him.
This he observed as he was standing near the curb and
on the sidewalk and was never in the street.
Wilma Lenoma Tully, a witness called by the State
testified that she met the defendant in Reno, Nevada on
Sunday, the 20th of ~lay about 7 o'clock A.M. She had
not known him before and they decided to come to Salt
Lake City where they arrived on Monday the 21st day
of ~lay, and registered at a motel and on Tuesday, May
22, they both went to Ogden where she purchased some
shells for a gun at the request of the defendant. They
spent most of the day in and around Ogden and decided
to remain there for the night, but later changed their
plans and proceeded to Salt Lake City, arriving about
11 P.l\I. and registering at the St. George Hotel. After
removing all of their belongings from the automobile
which had been parked on the street, the defendant
having informed the witness that they would not return
to Reno in the automobile but would attempt to obtain
passage on the air lines. On May 23, both spent the
morning shopping and visiting various taverns in Salt
Lake City. After eating lunch about 1 P.M. it was decided that they would return to Reno in the automobile
and obtained a cab for the purpose of locating the same
which was parked the previous night. The automobile
was located on State Street south of Third South and
both alighted from the cab and proceeded in the direction of the automobile. The ·witness got into the rar on
the right hand side and defendant proceeded around the
front of the automobile to get in on the left hand or
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driver's side. He was immediately accosted by Officer
Farley who was standing near the car and questioned as
to his identity. He was then searched by Officer Farley
which was observed by the witness. She stated that the
search was from the defendants armpitts to his kneea
(R. 138). The defendant was then handcuffed with his
hands behind him and assisted into the car sitting next
to the witness. Officer Farley sat next to the defendant
in the driver's seat, started the automobile and made a
"U" turn and headed toward the Police Station. Some
conversation took place between Officer Farley and the
defendant, immediately after crossing the intersection
at Third South Street it appeared to the witness that the
defendant was moving closer to the officer and was
locking shoulders with him (R. 139). She then heard a
shot and the officer lost control of the automobile which
crashed into a parked car. As soon as he lost control of
the automobile and while slumped the officer called to
a postman on the street requesting him to call an ambulance (R. 140). She then left the car by the right hand
door and ran to the sidewalk, entered the Regis Hotel
where she registered and remained there until 10 P.M.
and was then driven to Wendover where she was arrested
the following day.
K. Robert Tschaggeny testified that he was driving
his automobile south on State Street the afternoon of
May 23, 1951. He saw the automobile in which the defendant was riding and saw the defendant leave the
automobile and as he passed his car he observed that
the defendant was handcuffed and had a revolver in his
8
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hands. The defendant boarded a Salt Lake City Lines
bus at Third South and State Street. The witness followed the bus and at Fourth South he picked up Officer
Simonson and they followed the bus to Fifth South where
the defendant left the bus and disappeared. (R. 195).
Officer Simonson testified that he accompanied Mr.
Tschaggeny in his automobile and attempted to apprehend the defendant (R. 209). Mrs. Ronnie Charlot testified that she was sitting in her automobile at the A & W
Root Beer Stand at Fifth South and State Street and
the defendant approached her automobile stating, "I
have a gun here lady and I '11 shoot you if you don't do
what I say." (R. 214). That the defendant left immediatelyand the witness observed that he had a gun and his
hands were handcuffed behind his back. R. W. Fish
testified that he was an employee of the Streator Chevrolet Company and on :May 23, 1951, shortly after 2 :30
P ..M. he saw the defendant in the shop where he was
working. His hands were handcuffed in front of him
and he observed a gun in his hand and defendant threatened him (R. 220). Harry Jones testified that he found
a gun in the paint shop in a sink, which gun was offered
and received in evidence. (R. 224).
Officer Hunsaker identified the clothing worn by
Officer Farley and the same was received in evidence
(R. 233), together with the handcuffs. Officer Clark
was called as a witness and demonstrated to the jury
the movability of his hands after being handcuffed with
his hands behind him and while sitting on a chair in
9
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

front of the jury box and in the presence of the jury
(R. 237-242).
The defendant, called as a witness on his own behalf, testified that he obtained the DeSoto automobile
in San Francisco, California and left San Francisco for
Reno, Nevada on May 18. While in Reno he met Wilma
Lenoma Tully who accompanied him to Salt Lake City
where they arrived on Monday, the 21st day of May, and
went to Ogden arriving there about noon. While in
Ogden Mrs. Tully purchased a box of shells which were
the type and caliber which fit the gun owned by defendant, which gun was carried by Mrs. Tully in her handbag
from the time both left Reno for Salt Lake City. Both
defendant and Mrs. Tully participated in a robbery of
a motel in Ogden after which they returned to Salt Lake
City and registered at the St. George Hotel, leaving
their automobile on State Street below Third South after
removing all their clothing and belongings from such
automobile. At about 2 P.M. they attempted to locate
the automobile and were approaching it when the defendant was accosted by Officer Farley who placed him
under arrest after searching his person and proceeded
to the Police Station. The car stopped at the intersection
of Third South and State and after crossing the intersection Officer Farley pushed the defendant back in the
seat and reached across the defendant's lap. There was
a crash and a shot and Officer Farley went out the right
side of the car immediately after Mrs. Tully and the
defendant went out the left side and across State Street.

10
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He stated that at no time did he have the gun in his hands
and did not shoot Officer Farley.
On cross examination over defendant's objections
he testified that he had been convicted of three or four
felonies, the first in 1945. He was a parole violator from
the State of California, was wanted for stealing payroll
checks in California (R. 290) and if he was returned to
California he was going to have to serve from 5 years to
life (R. 290). He had cashed and forged 47 checks stolen
by him (R. 294). The defendant denied that before
leaving California he had robbed Fulton's Food Shop
and denied that he had committed a robbery of the Boulevard Pharmacy in California (R. 295) or robbed a grocery store in San Francisco. (R. 295)

STATEMENT OF ERRORS
I.

The court erred in refusing to recognize that the
State failed to prove the commission of the crime of first
degree murder, the evidence disclosing that:
(a) The verdict and judgment were contrary to law.
(b) The verdict and judgment were contrary to the
evidence.
(c) The evidence was insufficient to support the
verdict of the jury.
11
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II.
The court erred in allowing the witnesses, Norman
R. Cortsen and Mrs. Ronnie Charlot to testify over defendant's objections relative to statements made by the
defendant after the homicide.

III.
The court erred in allowing the witness Harold W.
Clark over defendant's objections, to demonstrate to the
jury the movability of his hands and body with a gun in
his hands handcuffed behind him.

IV.
The court erred in allowing the District Attorney,
over the objection of the defendant, to interrogate the
defendant relative to the commission of crimes by him
which in no way were connected with the crime for which
he was being tried.

v.
The court erred in allowing the District Attorney,
over the objections of the defendant, to interrogate the
defendant respecting the commission of crimes which the
defendant had not been charged with or convicted.

VI.
The court erred in denying defendant's motion for
a new trial.

12
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VII.
The court erred in denying defendant's motion for
a new trial in the absence of defendant's counsel.
VIII.
The court erred in imposing sentence on the defendant in the absence of defendant's counsel.
IX.

The court erred in denying defendant's motion for
a rehearing of defendant's motion for a new trial.

X.
The court erred in denying defendant's motion for
an order of examination of designated physical evidence
received at the trial.
XI.
The defendant was denied the right to a fair and
impartial trial.
ARGUMENT

I.
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE STATE FAILED TO
PROVE THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME OF
FIRST DEGREE MURDER, THERE BEING A
LACK OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE INSTRUCTION GIVEN BY THE COURT. (Specification of Error No. I, (a) (b) (c).
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At the close of the State's evidence, the defendant
filed his motion to dismiss the information as to the
offense of first degree murder as set out in such information, said motion being based on the grounds that the
State had failed to prove that the crime charged in such
information was the wilful, deliberate, malicious and
premeditated act of the defendant. (R. 17) Such motion
was by the court denied. (R. 18)
It is a well recognized and undisputed principle of
law in this state that in order for a person to be convicted of murder in the first degree and in order to
warrant an instruction defining this degree of murder,
there must be some evidence which would indicate that
the crime was premeditated and that at the exact time
of the commission of the crime there was in the mind of
the accused a specific intent to take the life of the victim.
This court has consistently, in a long line of decisions,
adhered to such rule and to cite the numerous decisions
of this court would be of no benefit or advantage to the
court. The evidence offered on behalf of the state was
that the shooting occurred during a scuffle between the
defendant and the deceased and there is wholly a lack
of evidence that the defendant, if the shooting was done
by the defendant, had any preconceived design to shoot
the deceased or that there was any deliberate or premeditated design to kill.
The evidence produced on behalf of the State is
wholly insufficient to support the verdict of the jury
and counsel for the defendant, under their statement of
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fads, have considered it necessary and essential to narrate the evidence and further to solicit the court's attention to their contention that under the evidence produced
it would have been impossible for the defendant to have
fired the shot that killed the deceased.
The undisputed evidence testified to by three witnesses for the state was that the defendant was thoroughly searched by the deceased before being placed in
the automobile a few moments before the shot was fired,
the other occupant of the car was not searched, in her
hands were her purse and a package, the defendant's
hands were handcuffed behind him, all three persons
occupied the front seat of the automobile, one shot was
fired immediately after the car crossed the intersection
at 3rd South and State Streets, and the assistant city
physician testified that the bullet that killed the deceased
entered the body at a point two inches above the naval
and one inch to the right of the middle line, the point
of exit being two inches to the left of the middle line of
the second lumbar vertebra.
From such evidence it cannot be disputed that the
deceased was shot from the front, which act, under the
circumstances, could not be done by a person with his
hands handcuffed behind his back. Witnesses produced
by the State testified to statements alleged to have been
made by the defendant at the time of the shooting. (R.
98-99, 110.) Such statements, according to the witnesses,
were heard by them while standing on the sidewalk from
10 to 20 feet away from the automobile in which the
15
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

defendant and the deceased were sitting. Such evidence
should be entitled to little or no weight considering the
circumstances under which such statements were alleged
to have been made.
Counsel for defendant is well aware that the answer
to the foregoing is that the jury believed otherwise and
there is not a lack of evidence upon which their verdict
could be sustained. However, we deem it worthy of
attention by the court and meriting consideration in connection with error hereinafter to be called to the attention of the court.
II.
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE WITNESS NORMAN R. CORTSEN, AND THE WITNESS MRS. RONNIE CHARLOT TO TESTIFY
OVER DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS RELATIVE TO STATEMENTS MADE BY THE DEFENDANT AFTER THE HOMICIDE. (Specification of Error No. II.)
The trial Court permitted witness Norman R. Cortsen to testify concerning a statement he claimed the
defendant made to him on a Salt Lake City Lines Bus
after the shooting of Officer Farley. This testimony
was admitted over the objection of defendant's counsel
(R. 203) and after an examination into the question of
its admissibility in chambers out of the presence of the
jury (R. 202).

16
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The testimony to which objection was made is as
follows: "Keep moving, I just shot a man". (R. 204)
This statement was alleged to have been made by the
defendant as the bus approached the intersection of 4th
South and State Streets, the defendant having boarded
the bus at 3rd South and State Streets.
Counsel for the defendant moved to strike the statement of Cortsen about what the defendant had said to
him on the grounds that it was hearsay and incompetent.
The motion was denied (R. 205).
It is significant that the statement "Keep moving,
I just shot a man", was, according to the witness Cortsen, not made until the bus reached the intersection of
4th South and State Streets. Although Cortsen claimed
certain other statements were made by the defendant,
he could not remember what they were (R. 208).
Counsel for the defendant contend that the statements of the defendant testified to by Cortsen were made
at a time and place sufficiently remote from the shooting
as not to be part of the res gestae, nor admissible under
any other recognized exception to the hearsay rule.
It should be borne in mind that after the shooting
the defendant left the car in which he and officer Farley
had been riding, ran west across State Street, then South
to 3rd South and State Streets, boarded a crowded bus
and rode a block through normal midday traffic before
the statement attributed to him was made. (R. 282-283.)
The same considerations are applicable to the state-
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ment the witness Mrs. Ronnie Charlot testified the defendant made to her. They were, however, more remote
in point of time and distance than those made to Norman
Cortsen.
After riding the bus from Third to Fifth South
Street on State Street the defendant entered a parked
car at the A. & W. Drive In which was occupied by Mrs.
Ronnie Charlot. (R. 214, R. 253) Mrs. Charlot stated
the defendant said to her, "I have a gun here lady, and
I'll shoot you if you don't do what I say". (R. 214)
It is the position of counsel that the statement IS
unrelated to the crime which was committed by reason
of the lapse of time between the commission of the crime
and the alleged statement, and further, and more important, it makes no reference to the shooting, nor to any of
the circumstances connected with it, or even that it
occurred. Counsel therefore urge that the statement,
obviously damaging to the defendant was not part of the
res gestae and was wholly inadmissible.
The theory upon which counsel for the State offered
the testimony of witness Cortsen was that the statement
alleged to have been made by the defendant to Cortsen
constituted an admission against interest, and admissible
as part of the res gestae, although hearsay. (R. 202)
This Court has frequently discussed the considerations governing what may or may not be received as
part of the res gestae. The general rule has been applied
by this Court in both criminal and civil cases. A state-
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ment of these general considerations is found in Jackson
Y. Utah Rapid Transit Co., 77 U. 21, 290 P. 970.
The ease inYolved a collision between an auto and a
street ear. A question arose as to the admissibility of
statements made by the motorman after the accident.
:Mr. Justice Staup says at page 976 as follows:
" ... the general limitations of the res gestae rule
so far as are here necessary, are stated to be that
the declaration or utterance must be spontaneous
or instinctiYe; that it must relate to or be connected with the main or principal event or transaction itself material and admissible in evidence;
and that it must have been the result or product,
the outgrowth, of the immediate and present influences of the main event, or preceding circumstances to which it relates, and must be contemporaneous with it and tend to explain or elucidate
it. It is further stated that the word 'contemporaneous' is not taken literally, and that time is not
the real governing factor in the determination,
but is an important element in determining
whether the statement was spontaneous and immediately connected with the main transaction and
prompted or produced by its immediate and
present influences.''
We believe this fairly states the general rule laid down
in numerous Utah cases and in well reasoned decisions
from other jurisdictions, and it remains only to apply
the rule, or rules to the testimony in question here. The
position of counsel for the defendant is that all the testimony received which is covered by this specification of
error was too remote in time and distance, and did not
amount to spontaneous or instinctive utterances.
19
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The case of People v. Wong Loung, 114 P. 829, decided by the Supreme Court of California was a prosecution for murder. The state introduced evidence of certain
statements made by the defendant to apprehending officers shortly after the shooting, during which time the
defendant had run one block. The court held that these
statements were improperly admitted in evidence. At
page 833 the court says :
''Error is assigned relative to the conversation
between the arresting officers when they took
Wong Loung into custody. One of them said, 'This
is the man', or 'This is the Chinaman', and the
defendant exclaimed, 'I haven't anything', or 'I
haven't done anything. I haven't got any gun'.
The Attorney General insists that this conversation was part of the res gestae and properly admitted as such. We cannot agree with that contention. The officers had run some distance from
the scene of the crime, turning a corner and proceeding along another street from that upon
which the wounded Chinaman fell, and had finally
apprehended Wong Loung near the end of an
alley. What there occurred was no more a part
of the res gestae than it would have been if their
pursuit had covered a mile rather than a distance
of about a block."
We submit that this is a proper application of the
considerations which determine what is part of the res
gestae, and the application which should be made to the
evidence under discussion in this specification of error.
The question of admissibility of what was claimed
to be part of the res gestae was discussed by this Court
in the recent case of State v. Peterson, 240 P. (2d) 504.
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A purported confession to the commission of a burglary
was made an hour after the crime was involved. The trial
court excluded the purported confession, and was affirmed by this Court. Mr. Justice Wolfe in the opinion
refers to a concurring opinion in State v. Rasmussen,
92 Utah 357, 68 P. (2d) 176, 183 and quotes from it as
follows:
'' ... the so-called res gestae is in fact simply another exception to the hearsay rule, based on the
fact that there are assurances sufficient to make
it reliable even though there is no opportunity to
cross examine. But that assurance based on the
spontaneity necessary to make it the automatic
result of the excitation engendered by the occasion
and to eliminate any probability that it was the
product of reflection or rationalization must be
present. It should be noted that since the sole
basis for admitting statements of this kind depends on ·what we have chosen to call their 'automatic' nature, the court should be fairly well
convinced that such basis exists; otherwise, statements of witnesses in regard to which there may
be no opportunity to cross-examine will be admitted to the great prejudice of the opposite
party''.
The opinion in the main case states :
"It is readily apparent that the extra-judicial
purported confession of Olmsted cannot meet this
prescribed test. Because of the time and the circumstances surrounding its making, it lacks the
characteristics which allow the relaxation of the
hearsay rule. The trial court properly excluded
from evidence the 'confession' of Olmstead''.
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We submit that the testimony offered by these two
witnesses was damaging to the defendant, and that upon
proper application of the rules prescribed by this court
for the determination of what may be admitted as part
of the res gestae, the testimony objected to should have
been excluded by the trial court.
III.
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE WITNESS HAROLD W. CLARK, OVER DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS, TO DEMONSTRATE TO
THE JURY THE MOVABILITY OF HIS HANDS
AND BODY WITH A GUN IN HIS HANDS
HANDCUFFED BEHIND HIM. (Specification
of Error No. III.)
During the trial Police officer Harold W. Clark was
permitted to make a demonstration for the jury concerning his ability to point a gun at an imaginary person
at his left while his hands were cuffed behind him. This
purported demonstration was objected to by counsel for
the defendant (R. 238-239).
The witness Wilma Lenoma Tully testified that as
officer Farley, the defendant and she drove from ihe
scene of the arrest toward the police station they were
all seated in the front seat of the defendant's rented car.
Officer Farley was in the driver's seat, the defendant
in the middle, and Wilma Tully on the right hand side
opposite the driver. (R. 180, 181) This seating arrangement is corroborated by the testimony of Mrs. Jasmine
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G. Lym. (R. 75, 77) Other witnesses to the arrest also
testified that Officer Farley, the defendant, and Wilma
Tully were all seated in the front seat as the officer
drove away.
In his demonstration Officer Clark was permitted
to use a folding chair with no arms. There were no persons seated on either side of him. He was permitted to
swing his legs to the right of the chair so that he was
facing sideways on it. (R. 239) No one was seated to
the left of Officer Clark to demonstrate what part of the
body of a person there seated (the position Officer Farley occupied in the car) would have been in the line of
fire of the gun, or at what angle the gun would have
been pointed at the body of a person so seated. (R. 239}
There was a complete and absolute lack of similarity
between the conditions existing at the time when Officer
Farley was shot, and those which were present during
the demonstration offered by the State to show how the
defendant might have shot officer Farley from the position he occupied in the car. The failure of the State to
have someone seated in the position to the left of the
witness Clark during the demonstration is important
when it is considered that the bullet which killed officer
Farley entered his body at a point one inch above and
one and one half inches to the right of the umbilicus,
and emerged two inches to the left of the midline of the
back at the level of the second lumbar vertebra. This is
found in the testimony of Dr. John Marshall who performed an autopsy (R. 40). It is apparent from this
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testimony that the bullet passed almost directly through
officer Farley's body from front to back, and it makes
the angle at which the gun was pointed at him of extreme
importance. No effort was made whatever by the State
to simulate the conditions which existed at the time of
the shooting so that the jury could see during the demonstration whether it would have been possible for the
defendant from the position in which he was sitting to
have shot officer Farley at the angle from which he was
shot, or in fact to have shot him at all.
The general rule announced by numerous decisions
with respect to the admissibility of demonstrative evidence, or experiments is that to render experiments permissible the conditions need not be identical with those
existing at the time of the occurrence, but that it is sufficient if there is a substantial similarity. The rule appears to obtain in civil as well as in criminal cases. State
v. Copenbarge, Idaho, 16 P. (2d) 383, State v. McKenna,
California, 79 P. (2d) 1065; Cooper v. State, Okla., 67 P.
(2d) 981; People v. Crawford, California, 106 P. (2d)
219; Hamby v. People, Colo., 129 P. (2d) 993.
The case of Hall v. Brown, Oregon, 202 P. 719, states
the general rule above contended for. The case involved
an action by a lessee of farming land for recovery for
loss of the property at the hands of the lessor, damage
to crops, and for money spent in sowing and cultivating.
A witness for plaintiff was permitted to testify he had
seen the land in question and that he assumed the method
of cultivation by the plaintiff was like his own.
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At page 721 the court makes the following statements:
''Such testimony is very closely analogous to evidence of experiments and is governed by similar
rules. Similar occurrences, like experiments are
admissible under certain circumstances for the
purpose of showing the probable result of the
transaction in question, but to be admissible it
must be shown that the conditions are substantially like those in the matter in dispute."
The court at page 721 quotes from an earlier Oregon
case, Leonard v. Southern, 21 Ore. 555, 28 P. 887, as
follows:
''Experiments and demonstrations used in evidence should be made under conditions similar to
those attending the fact to be illustrated; and
when this rule is observed, the discretion of the
trial court in allowing the result of such experiments to go to the jury will not be reviewed, in
the absence of abuse thereof. ' '
The Court then comments upon when the trial court
has discretion and uses the following language:
'' The principle is that at best it is within the discretion of the court to admit any testimony whatever about experiments or similar occurrences.
But in any event the conditions must appear to be
substantially the same. It is not within the discretion of the court to admit evidence about experiments, unless the conditions are substantially
alike.''
It is the position of counsel for the defendant that
the conditions present at the demonstration in court by
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officer Clark were so completely dissimilar to those
which existed at the time of the shooting that the trial
court was without discretion to admit the demonstration,
and further that if it could be presumed that the nature
of the demonstration lay within the area of discretion
of the trial court that the permission to make the demonstration by Clark was clearly an abuse of such discretion. It seems manifest, that the demonstration was
highly damaging and prejudicial to the defendant 1n
view of the way in which it was conducted.
In People v. Halbert, Cal., 248 P. 969, the following
comment appears at page 972 bearing upon the degree
of similarity of conditions necessary to permit the introduction of experimental evidence:
''In order that experimental evidence in corroboration or disproof shall be of any value, it must
be shown that the conditions affecting the result
are, as near as may be identical with those existing
at the time of and operating to produce the particular effect. An absolute identity is, of course,
impossible, but a substantial identity must exist
to give the evidence value.''
We submit that in the trial of this case the substantial identity is wholly lacking and the evidence should
not have been received under any theory of similar
occurrences or experiments.
In Harper v. Blasi, Colo., 151 P. (2d) 760, an action
for assault and battery, the trial court permitted a witness to testify as to an experiment conducted by him
with a mask, an artificial eye and rimless glasses to
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determine whether a blow struck as plaintiff testified
could have produced the injury complained of. The
Supreme Court of Colorado in the opinion held that the
admission of such evidence was error, and at page 761
of 151 P. (2d) uses the following language:
"We think the experiment and its description
improper. There was no similarity of conditions,
no way of establishing equality of strength or
skill, and no indication that, accepting the conclusions of the witness, this evidence was even helpful. There was no compliance with the rules
under which similar experiments are held admissible ... "
The case of Martin v. Anges City Baseball Ass'n.,
California, 40 P. (2d) 287 has some important comment
upon the care which must be exercised by the trial court
in determining the admissibility of demonstrative evidence where bodily movements are sought to be simulated. The case was a damage suit for injury arising
when the plaintiff fell while going down a stairway
owned by the defendant ball club. The defendant offered
evidence of experiment by a witness in approaching and
descending the stairway in the manner the plaintiff had
testified she had done it. At page 288 of 40 P. (2d) the
court had the following to say :
"While it is the general rule that experimental
evidence is admissible if it substantially tends to
establish the fact it is offered to prove, it is
nevertheless discretionary with the trial court to
limit the extent to which such evidence may be
received; and it is the duty of the court to refuse
its admission when it is doubtful whether it is
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likely to tend more to confusion than to justify or
certainty. (citing cases) The results of experiments made by an individual chosen for the purpose to demonstrate bodily movements in walking
or in approaching and descending a stairway are
so likely in the nature of things to be what the
mind of the individual suggests that it is extremely doubtful whether such personal experiments
are safe as proof. Clearly there was no abuse of
discretion in denying admission of such proof
under the circumstances of this case.''
It is strenuously urged that the demonstration of
officer Clark was of that kind and depended largely if
not entirely for its execution on ''what the mind of the
individual suggests''. Such evidence should be received
with caution even where some similarity of conditions
is shown, and certainly should not be received in a case
of this kind where no similarity exists at all.
This Court's attention is invited to a recent California case, People v. Sherman, 217 P. (2d) 715. This
was an arson prosecution wherein there was attempted
to be demonstrated the relative inflammability of certain
materials which were claimed to have been burned in
the building damaged. The trial court was affirmed for
denying admission of such evidence even though the
materials were the same, the same conditions did not
exist in the court room as in the upholstery shop which
was burned.
The case of R. D. Clancy v. State of Texas, 247 S.W.
865, was a prosecution for aggravated assault. The defendant allegedly while sitting in a motion picture theater
28
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

unauthorizedly placed his hand on the leg of a young
woman sitting near him. At the trial evidence was offered by the sheriff as to certain experiments he had
conducted with the theater seats to determine if the
touching could have been done by the defendant in the
manner claimed. The evidence was received and the
Court of Criminal appeals held that it was error for
want of a showing of similarity of conditions between
the actual occurrence and the experiment. A report of
this case appears in 27 A.L.R. 857, a~d at page 859 the
opinion states as follows:
''Complaint is made of the admission of the testimony of the sheriff as to experiments made by
him with certain chairs in the theater building in
question. It is made to appear as a result of such
experiment the sheriff found that the hand of a
person sitting in a seat could be thrust under the
seat beside him, under certain conditions, in such
manner as to be able to reach and touch the leg
of a person sitting to the rear. The general rule
in regard to testimony of experiments is that
same must be made under conditions similar, or
approximately similar, to those which surrounded
the original transaction, and when there is objection made, proof must appear of substantial
similarity. We find nothing in the record which
shows that all the seats in the theater in question
were similarly constructed, and the proof as to
the fact that the chairs examined by the sheriff
were similar to those occupied by appellant and
the young woman in question seems to fail. It was
a material question as to whether a hand could be
reached under the seat and placed upon the leg of
the prosecuting witness, between her ankle and
her knee. The testimony as to the experiment, if
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of a similar situation, was material. In the absence of a showing of substantial similarity the
evidence of the experiment should not have been
received.''
IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY, OVER THE OBJECTIONS
OF THE DEFENDANT TO INTERROGATE THE
DEFENDANT RESPECTING THE COMMISSION OF CRIMES WITH WHICH THE DEFENDANT HAD NEITHER BEEN CHARGED
NOR CONVICTED. (Specification of Error IV.V.)
The defendant testified in his own behalf at the trial
(R. 245-288) and was subjected to extensive cross examination by counsel for the state. It is the belief of
counsel for the defendant that in the commission of the
errors referred to in these specifications the greatest
injustice was done to this defendant at the trial. Nothing
could be less fair or more completely prejudicial to thiA
defendant than the questions the District Attorney was
permitted to ask the defendant under the guise of testing
his credibility. The questions asked the defendant and
called to this court's attention in these two specifications
of error clearly show that an unqualified effort was made
to try this defendant upon the basis of his past record,
and not upon the facts which might be adduced by the
prosecution tending to show that the defendant committed the crime with which he was here charged.
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The line of questions put to the defendant on cross
examination respecting his previous criminal record
began with the District Attorney asking whether the
defendant had been convicted of a felony, to which he
answered that he had. (R. 288) The District Attorney
then asked how many, to which an objection was made,
and overruled. (R. 289) The defendant was then asked
to state the kind and number of felonies. (R. 289) The
defendant was asked if he didn't know at the time of
the arrest that he was wanted by the state parole officer
of California. This was objected to and the objection
overruled. (R. 289)
The defendant was then asked if he didn't know he
was wanted in California for four robberies. (R. 290}
This was objected to and again the objection was overruled. It is significant to note that nowhere in the record
is there any offer to show that the defendant was wanted
for any robberies anywhere.
Upon further cross examination the defendant was
extensively questioned about his violation of parole, and
the possibility that he would be returned to California
to serve additional time. All this was objected to and
the objections were overruled. (R. 289-290) Still later
the defendant was questioned, over the objection of his
counsel which was overruled, about the perpetration of
certain forgeries. (R. 294)
Still later in cross examination the District Attorney
was permitted over the objection of counsel for the
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defendant (R. 294) to ask the following specific questions:

"Q. Now, and before you left California you
robbed the Fulton Food Shop at 1801 Fulton
Street in San Francisco, didn't you~ (R.
295)
A. No sir. (R. 295)
Q. And before you left California and on May
17, you committed a robbery at the Boulevard Pharmacy at eight twenty-three P.M.
on May 17, didn't you~ (R. 295)

A. No sir. (R. 295)
Q. And before you left California you committed a robbery at a grocery store on May 17
at eight forty-five P.M., the grocery store
being at 37 40 Irving Street in San Francisco,
California~ You pulled that robbery, didn't
you~ (R. 296)

A. No sir. (R. 296)
The damaging and meretricious aspect of these questions which the prosecution was permitted to ask is that
there is not a shred of evidence in the record, and none
was ever offered that this defendant was ever charged
with such robberies, or in fact that such crimes had- ever
been committed.
It is the position of counsel that if the prosecution
is permitted to ask questions of that sort without ever
laying any kind of foundation, or introducing any evidence whatever that the defendant has been charged,
or that the crimes have been committed, that a DiRtrict
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Attorney can accuse a defendant of the commission of
any crime, or any number of crimes whether they are
connected in any way with the defendant. This puts the
defendant in the position of having to deny something
with which, as in this case, he has never been charged.
It gives, and is designed to give, the jury the impression
that the defendant is an habitual criminal, and that none
of his testimony is to be believed. It is difficult to imagine any type or line of questions which could be more
completely prejudicial to this or any defendant, and we
submit that such questions were put to the defendant
with no other purpose that to prejudice him with the
jury.
The general rule is that the commission of the offense for which a person is on trial cannot be proved by
evidence that such person committed another but independent offense.

"* * * evidence which shows or tends to show that
accused has committed another crime wholly independent of, and unconnected with, that for which
he is on trial, even though it is a crime of the same
sort, is irrelevant and inadmissible, and such evidence of an independent crime is inadmissible for
the reason, among others, that it ordinarily does
not tend to establish the commission by accused
of the offense charged, that accused must be tried
for one offense at a time, and that, in accordance
with the more extensive general rule, which applies to all cases, civil or criminal, the evidence
must be confined to the point in issue. Questions
regarding the admissibility of such evidence have
been said to be within the wise discretion of the
trial court, whose rulings thereon should not be
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interfered with on review except where such discretion is abused, or unless it is clear that the
questioned evidence has no bearing on any of the
issues involved in the charge.''
22 C.J.S., Criminal law, Sec. 682.
The case of State v. Owen, Kansas, 176 P. (2d) 564,
in discussing the general rule as to the admissibility of
such evidence, notes as follows :
''Evidence of a similar offense is competent only,
under the exceptions to the general rule, as tending to show the elements of the offense for which
a person is on trial. A majority of this court believes that the conviction of the former offense
had no probative value with reference to any element of crime for which appellant was on trial.
The evidence was prejudicial and its admission
over appellant's objection constituted an abuse of
sound judicial discretion. Counsel for the state
also placed too much emphasis on the former
offense in his cross-examination of appellant. In
view of this conclusion we need not determine
whether the former offense was a similar offense
or whether the instruction requires a reversal.
It is sufficient to say the instruction did not cure
the erroneous admission of the testimony.''
This court has held in numerous cases that if facts
constituting collateral offenses are relevant and tend to
establish any of the necessary elements of the crime
charged, other than by merely showing defendant's bad
character and propensity to commit similar crimes, proof
of such facts are admissible even though showing that
defendant has committed other offenses. State v. N emier,
34
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

et al., 106 Utah 307, 148 P. (2d) 327, and cases therein
cited. At page 329 it is stated:
"Very frequently there is found in the cases some
form of rule like the following: 'Evidence of
similar offenses are never admissible except to
prove some fact in issue.' Now obviously this
form of statement is substantially the original
rule, putting the substance of the old into the
form of the new. * * * See e. g., 8 R.C.L. (1914)
199: 'The rule against admitting proof of extraneous crimes is subject, however, to certain
exceptions. In making proof it is competent for
the prosecution to put in evidence all relevant
facts and circumstances which tend to establish
any of the constitutive elements of the crime of
which the defendant is accused.' This was adopted by the court in State v. Anderton, supra, and
other cases. ''
The court reviewed the evidence in the cases of State
v. Anderton, 81 Utah 320, 17 P. (2d) 917, and People v.
Coughlin, 13 Utah 58, 44 P. 94, in State v. Nemier, supra,
and concluded that the evidence of prior crimes was
admissible under an exception to the general rule, and
stated that the evidence objected to was admissible as
indicating a purpose or design to kill or do great bodily
harm to anyone who attempted to interfere with the
defendant's escape.
In the case of State v. Nemier, supra, the evidence
of the defendants' escape from the prison can be consistently connected with the assault on the guards committed
in connection with the escape and was no doubt one of
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the elements which constituted the crime for which the
defendants were on trial.
It is respectfully submitted that the cross examination of the defendant as herein referred to and the
inferences drawn therefrom by the District Attorney
were matters incapable of proof, were not attempted
to be proven, was not evidence of a similar offense and
cannot be admissible to prove other similar offenses
committed by the accused and did not tend to establish
any of the necessary elements of the crime charged.

v.
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFEND··
ANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL, SUCH
MOTION HAVING BEEN DENIED AND SENTENCE IMPOSED IN THE ABSENCE OF
COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANT. (Specification of Error Nos. VI, VII, VIII.)
A motion to set aside the verdict of the jury and
grant the defendant a new trial was filed on October 9,
1951 (R. 338-339), and an order of the court sentencing
the defendant and denying such motion was entered on
October 16, 1951 (R. 340). Neither of defendant's counsel was present when the motion was denied and sentence
imposed, the record is silent as to the date of sentence
or hearing on the motion for a new trial, and counsel
for the defendant were not apprised of such hearing
and date of sentence.
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Article 1, Section 12, of the Constitution of the State
of Utah provides in part :
''In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have
the right to appear and defend in person and by
counsel * * * to have a speedy public trial by an
impartial jury of the County or district in which
the offense is alleged to have been committed. * * *"
Section 105-1-8, Laws of Utah 1943, provides:
"Rights of defendant; (1) to appear and defend
in person and by counsel.''
This court, in State v. Aikers, 87 Utah 507, 51 P.
(2d) 1052, stated:
"There is no doubt but that the constitutional
right to appear and defend in person and by
counsel is a sacred right of one accused of crime
which may not be infringed or frittered away, and
·is one which may not be denied by the court or be
waived by counsel.''
VI.
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A REHEARING OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL AND
IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR AN
ORDER FOR AN EXAMINATION OF DESIGNATED PHYSICAL EVIDENCE. (Specification
of Error, Nos. IX, X.)
Defendant's motion for a rehearing on his motion
for a new trial was filed on November 3, 1951 (R. 341),
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and a motion for an order requ1nng examination of
physical evidence received at the trial was filed on November 3, 1951 (R. 342). Both motions were supported
by affidavits, one by counsel for the defendants, and the
other by Ed Jackson, a member of the Salt Lake City
police department. Both motions were by the court
denied (R. 345-346).
The theory advanced by the prosecution and argued
to the jury was, among other things, that the defendant
at the time of the shooting, had concealed in the automobile, presumably behind the front seat, the gun which
was fired and caused the death of Officer Farley. No
police officer at any time testified that the automobile
had ever been searched, even though such was a fact and
within the knowledge of the officers who had the automobile under constant surveillance for a long period of
time. Officer Jackson, after the trial of the case and
after the imposition of sentence and the denial of defendant's motion for a new trial, disclosed such information.
During the course of the trial the coat worn by Officer Farley at the time of the shooting was introduced
in evidence. Such coat contained a perforation with
powder burns. The coat was taken by the jury at the
time of their deliberation and was no doubt examined
by the jury and influenced them in arriving at their verdict. No evidence was offered by the State of a scientific
character to establish the distance from which a shot
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would have to have been fired to produce the powder
burns on the coat worn by deceased.
The affidavits were the basis of defendant's motion
for a rehearing and defendant's motion for a new trial,
which motion was by the court denied (R. 346). It is
the contention of counsel for the defendant that the
court erred in such denial, that the requests were not
unreasonable and that the newly discovered evidence
was a vital factor in determining the guilt or innocence
of the defendant.
VII.
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED THE RIGHT
TO A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL. (Specification of Error No. XI.)
The jury was impaneled on October 2, 1951, and the
trial proceeded throughout the day. On the evening of
October 2nd there appeared in a local newspaper the
names and addresses of the jurors, together with a statement that police records show that the defendant was
wanted for three robberies, a larceny, and on 47 counts
of passing bad checks, for a robbery in Ogden and driving
a stolen automobile across a state line. This was called
to the attention of the court on the morning of October
3, 1951, the court at that time informed counsel that if
it was their desire the court would order a mistrial.
Counsel did not request a mistrial and the court admonished the jury regarding the newspaper article. (R.
99)
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Counsel does not at this late date complain of the
action of the court that was acquiesed in. It is, however,
a circumstance worthy of mention in connection with
the contention of counsel that the defendant was denied
the right to a fair and impartial trial. This incident,
when taken into consideration and in connection with
error argued herein, should be given consideration when
a defendant has been convicted and sentenced to be
executed for an offense which under the circumstances
as disclosed by the evidence could not have been committed by him.
It is submitted that the verdict of the jury and the
sentence of the court should be set aside and the defendant granted a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
EDW. M. MORRISSEY
ARTHUR A. ALLEN, JR.
Attorneys for Defendant
arnd Appellant

Receipt of copies of the above and foregoing Brief
of the defendant and appellant acknowledged this -----------day of J nne, 1952.

Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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